Braxton Bragg:
The Most Hated Man of the Confederacy
Earl J. Hess
University of North Carolina Press, 2016, 368 pp., $35.00

 
Review by Gordon Berg


Among Civil War enthusiasts and scholars, Braxton Bragg has long occupied a place near the top of the list of generals we love to hate.  Truth be told, he did a lot to earn the reputation both during his lifetime and after.  But a reevaluation of his personality and professional capabilities by a reputable scholar is long overdue and Earl Hess is just the man to do it.
 
Hess is a prolific author on many Civil War subjects with a well-earned reputation for shedding new light on long accepted theses.  Bragg could not have asked for a more thoughtful, careful, and scrupulously honest evaluator.  "Historians," Hess maintains, "have tended to see Bragg as the actor in creating a circle of negativity around him, but we also must understand that he was in turn deeply affected by the actions and opinions of others." 

Fortunately, Hess has never been awed by pedigree, either from the subjects he investigates or from fellow historians with whom he spars, intellectually of course.  This tends to make him a lively and informative read.

 
The book is an investigation of Bragg's military career, not a full blown biography.  Nevertheless, Hess makes clear that Bragg's wife Elsie was the staunchest--and sometimes the only--source of emotional support for him.  Bragg's inability to form personal attachments and accept the limitations of others haunted him throughout his military career.  "He saw life in black-and-white terms," Hess posits, "had scant ability to accept the complexities to be found in others, and possessed a stubborn streak that served him ill in his relations with subordinates."

 
The breadth of Hess' expertise allows him to analyze carefully Bragg's abilities on the battlefield, both as a tactical commander and as the commanding general of an entire army.  Bragg fought with distinction at Shiloh although he can rightly be criticized for inserting his units piecemeal into the fray.  Hess believes that the troops of the Army of Tennessee did some of their best fighting under Bragg's command at Stones River.  At Chickamauga, the Army of Tennessee was at the height of its powers and achieved one of the Confederacy's few tactical victories in the West.  Nonetheless, Hess boldly writes, "The sad truth was that all three of Bragg's corps commanders--Polk, Longstreet, and Hill--were willful, unreliable subordinates who could not be counted on to obey orders or to cooperate with their commanders."  Not surprisingly, this nest of vipers spawned the revolt of the generals that spread through Bragg's army and percolated up to the attention of President Jefferson Davis.  Bragg never fully recovered from this attempted coup de grace.

 
Too many historians, Hess believes, have relied on negative observations and conclusions offered by Bragg's subordinates and which were repeated in newspapers of the day and, as a result, have become cemented in the historical record.  Hess, on the other hand, sees Bragg as "an officer of undoubted qualities" that included being "hardworking, meticulous, detail-oriented and extremely self-disciplined."  Of course, those same qualities can be attributed to someone who is overbearing, petty, and reclusive.  Bragg has often been seen that way as well.

 
Hess writes with an easy grace born of erudite scholarship and years in the classroom challenging fresh eyes to look upon old stories and interpret them in new ways.  Readers may or may not come away with the same interpretation of Bragg as Hess posits, but it is hard to argue with his final assessment of the general:  "Bragg was a fascinating mixture of good and bad qualities; his impact on Confederate history was enormous, and we are still grappling with it."  Clearly Hess makes no claim on having the last word about his subject.  Good historians never do.

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Gordon Berg is a past President and member of the Civil War Round Table of the District of Columbia (www.cwrtdc.org).  His reviews and articles appear in the Civil War Times and America's Civil War, among other publications.      
A Field Guide to Antietam:
Experiencing the Battlefield
through Its History, Places, and People
Carol Reardon & Tom Vossler
University of North Carolina Press, 2016, 360 pp., $23.00

Review by Gordon Berg

Carol Reardon and Tom Vossler set a new standard for field guides with their earlier publication about the Battle of Gettysburg.  They have maintained the same high quality for a similar guide on Antietam, the battle that changed the Union's war aims from merely preserving the nation as it was ante bellum to include emancipating four million slaves, a change that fundamentally altered the essence of American democracy.  The importance of the battle is matched by the quality of the narrative, maps, and illustrations that make this guide informative and easy to use by experienced battlefield trampers and novices alike.
 


The key to the success of this guide lies in the six questions posed and answered by the authors:  What happened here?  Who fought here?  Who commanded here?  Who fell here?  Who lived here?  What did they say about it later?  There are even helpful hints on the best way to tour the battlefield including the times and costs for accessing the battlefield park, how to use the roads that traverse its landscape, the stops included on the auto tour as well as others picked by the authors, and the basic etiquette appropriate for making a visit to Antietam's hallowed ground a rewarding experience for everyone.


The tour begins at the Visitor Center maintained by the National Park Service.  The guide then highlights twenty-one locations in and around the park where significant action occurred.  The tour concludes--appropriately for the battle that was the bloodiest day in American history--at the Antietam National Cemetery, the final resting place for 4,766 Civil War dead.  In between, the guide escorts visitors and readers to places bearing names like Nickodemus Heights, the Mumma Farm, the Dunker Church, the West Woods, Rohrback's Bridge, the Sunken Road, Boteler's Ford, and other locations that have become iconic in Civil War historiography.

President Abraham Lincoln visited Sharpsburg, the Maryland town nearest the battlefield, two weeks after the fighting there concluded.  The Union victory, although not conclusive, allowed him to announce the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation.  For the authors, "the results of this battle recalibrated the political foundation for understanding and fighting this war."  Their fine battlefield guide recalibrates our appreciation for its continuing legacy.


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Gordon Berg is a past President and member of the Civil War Round Table of the District of Columbia (www.cwrtdc.org).  His reviews and articles appear in the Civil War Times and America's Civil War, among other publications.
The Civil War on the Mississippi:
Union Sailors, Gunboat Captains, and the Campaign To Control the River
Barbara Brooks Tomblin
The University Press of Kentucky, 2016, 372 pp., $50.00

Review by Gordon Berg

From the outset of the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln and his military staff knew that controlling the Mississippi River was vital to defeating the Confederacy.  But to do so, the Union would need a new kind of navy, a "brown water" navy with new kinds of ships that could ply the notoriously fickle Father of Waters.

That's the story Barbara Tomblin tells from the Union Navy perspective, adroitly using a wealth of letters, diaries, and memoirs written by commodores, captains, and ordinary blue jackets.
These are not uncharted waters that Tomblin navigates.  Since Virgil Carrington Jones chronicled operations on the western waters, others have followed, concentrating on various aspects of naval and combined army/navy campaigns.  Tomblin herself has been sailing these waters since her dissertation days, and while she doesn't offer a new analysis of the military, her encyclopedic knowledge of the Union sailors and their experiences makes her narrative flow with clarity and confidence.


At first, the Western Flotilla was a mongrel assortment of converted river packets and leftovers from the Mexican War.  They were officered by a few, often reluctant, career naval officers, guided by some experienced pilots, and crewed by a motley amalgam of river men, new recruits, and, quite often, reluctant army volunteers.  Whipping men and ships into an efficient fighting force fell to Commodore Andrew Hull Foote, an old salt described by one of his captains as "not a man of striking physical appearance, but there was a sailor-like heartiness and frankness about him."  Together with another man not of striking physical appearance -- Ulysses S. Grant -- they began to change Union military fortunes and make a navy master of the Mississippi and other western rivers.  By the end of the war, the Mississippi was awash with an armada of ironclads, timberclads, mortar barges, Ellet Rams, and Pook Turtles that became part of the mightiest navy in the world.


The life of a sailor, whether blue water or brown, leaves a lot of free time between watches.  Tomblin has found some of the most prolific and literate of them and lets their words carry much of the narrative.  Captain Henry Walke, commander first of the Tyler and later of the Carondelet and Lafayette chronicles Belmont, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, and Island Number 10 as seen from the pilot house.  Irish-born seaman John G. Morison kept a journal throughout his wartime service and his gunner's description of the Carondelet's encounter with the powerful CSS Arkansas on July 14, 1862, is both accurate and descriptive. "She mounted ten heavy guns, three on each side and two forward and aft, Morison wrote.  "Altogether she was a mighty unpleasant looking critter to be closing you up and at the same time throwing solid shot through you."
The Battle of Memphis was strictly a navy show.  Commodore Charles H. Davis's squadron, although outnumbered two-to-one, thoroughly bested the Confederate River Defense Force.  Fourteen year old seaman George Yost, aboard the Cairo, reported "The battle lasted about 1 1/2 hours.  The last boat was captured at 7 A.M."  Mound City crewman Symmes Browne proudly told his fiancee "The Mississippi is comparatively open, and there is no more fighting for the gunboats."


Browne's prediction was premature.  There was much more work for the gunboats and Tomblin provides detailed descriptions of the first Vicksburg Campaign, Arkansas Post and Fort Hindman, Steele's Bayou, Yazoo Pass, Port Hudson, Grand Gulf, and the final blockade and siege of Vicksburg.  She concedes that "Service in the brown-water navy was not glamorous duty" but critical to to the success of Union strategic plans that would eventually win the war.
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Gordon Berg is a past President and member of the Civil War Round Table of the District of Columbia (www.cwrtdc.org).  His reviews and articles appear in the Civil War Times and America's Civil War, among other publications.
Editor's Note:  As Gordon Berg often reminds our group, there are books about related topics that Civil War buffs would enjoy.  Consistent with that spirit, included is the following review of a book about the Battle of Waterloo, which provides a overview of certain misconceptions about the length of the war, the problems (and benefits) with Napoleonic tactics, and the key errors made in the movement of troops, some of which have analogues in the Civil War.

Waterloo: The Battle of Four Days, Three Armies, and Three Battles

By Bernard Cornwell
Published by William Collins, 352 pp., UK £25.00, Can. $44.99

Review by Carl Frank

As an initial matter, I recommend that you only buy the hardback edition. Don't even think of downloading it in electronic form.  This is a gloriously handsome book with with far more color (excuse me, colour) plates and maps than in similar works. For example, it includes Lady Elizabeth Butler's "Scotland Forever" (see wikimedia/wikipedia link), though Cornwell explains it is inaccurate.

Such "Saxon Tales" storytelling of a Napoleonic battle isn't for everyone; it is marred upon occasion by over-dramatic storytelling hardly necessary for the most consequential land battle of the first half of the 19th Century (and perhaps the entire Century).  I have a feeling this book will annoy more knowledgeable readers, but it is a good basic introduction, and a wonderful reference for those of us old enough to have bookcases.

My prior familiarity with Waterloo came in two or three biographies of Napoleon. So I'll have to read another to see whether the pattycake approach obscured fact. For me, the key insight was Cornwell's "scissors, paper, stone" analogy ("rock, paper, scissors" in North America) to Napoleonic land warfare: cavalry could attack infantry, whose defense was the square, which was vulnerable to artillery--but to win, the timing of the attack had to be perfect. Napoleon's and Marshal Ney's wasn't. 


"They had expected a swift victory over the ragged armies of Revolutionary France, but instead they sparked a world war which saw both Washington and Moscow burned."

"A few weeks before Waterloo[, the Duke of Wellington] was walking in a Brussels park with Thomas Creevey, a British parliamentarian, who rather anxiously asked the Duke about the expected campaign. A red-coated British infantryman was staring at the park's statues and the Duke pointed at the man. 'There', he said, 'there. It all depends upon that article whether we do the business or not. Give me enough of it, and I am sure.'"

French officer Captain Pierre Cardon was summoned along with all the infantry regiment. The stood in two ranks "asking each other what was going on? What was there? In the end we were filled with worry. [Then, his Colonel appeared] holding in his hands, what? You would not guess in a hundred years. . . Our eagle, under which we had marched so many times to victory and which the brave Colonel had hidden inside the mattress of his bed. . . . At the sight of the cherished standard cries of 'Vive l'Empereur' could be heard; soldiers and officers, all overwhelmed, wanted not only to see, but to embrace and touch it; this incident made every eye flow with tears of emotion… we have promised to die beneath our eagle for the country and Napoleon."

Napoleon believed he could push the Prussians around, then turn his attack to the British. It was all going to plan and the Emperor would take breakfast in Brussels's Laeken Palace on Saturday morning.

“Except Ney had still not captured Quatre-Bras."

Alarmed, the Emperor delayed the attack until he discovers the identity of these newly arrived troops. They turn out to be his own men, but in the wrong place, “so a messenger rides to d'Erlon ordering him to turn northwards and assault the Prussian flanks, but just then yet another courier arrives, this one from Marshal Ney, demanding that d'Erlon return to Quatre-Bras immediately.”

Facing two conflicting orders, D'Erlon assumes that Ney is in the more dire straits, so turns his Corps around and retraces his steps for Quatre-Bras. The Emperor launches his great attack, but by the time he realizes d'Erlon is not engaged, the 1st Corps has vanished.  Many say Waterloo was lost because  22,000 men spent Friday marching between two battlefields and helping neither. D'Erlon “could have swung either the battle at Ligny or the fighting at Quatre-Bras, had achieved nothing. It is the French equivalent of the Grand Old Duke of York, except d'Erlon spent his day halfway between two fights, neither up nor down, and his prevarication denied Napoleon the crushing victory he expected."

"[The Duke of Wellington] was not loved as Blücher was, nor worshipped like Napoleon, but he was respected. He could be sharply witty; long after the wars were over, some French officers pointedly turned their backs on him in Paris, for which rudeness a woman apologized. 'Don't worry, Madame,' the Duke said, 'I've seen their backs before.'"

At Hougoumont, Macdonell, saved the Allied right flank by realizing that killing Legros, the French Sous-Lieutenant who axed-open the door to that house, was irrelevant.  The key to the fighting was to shut the gate, denying entry to any more of the French.  So he and a small group bypassed Legros and his men and forced the huge gates shut.  The heaved against the pressure from outside while Legros tried to kill them inside.   

“Wellington once remarked that closing the gates [at Hougoumont] was the decisive act of battle and, later, when an eccentric clergyman wanted to arrange an annuity for 'the bravest man at Waterloo' and requested the Duke to make such a difficult judgement, Wellington chose Macdonnell. Macdonnell, in turn, insisted on sharing the money with Sergeant James Graham, an Irishman who had been at his side in those decisive moments, the pair did receive the annuity for two years before the generous clergyman lost his money, but it is significant that Wellington, forced to make a decision, nominated Macdonnell and, by association, Graham."

At his point, Napoleon now faces a dilemma. Wellington's army is in front of him, and he knows a heavy force of Prussians was approaching to his right.  The two, together, greatly outnumber him.  Yet he still thought he could defeat them in detail.  “This morning we had ninety chances of winning,' the Emperor told Soult, 'we still have sixty."

French cavalry climbed the crest of the ridge, and they may have thought victory was imminent—bodies lay everywhere, and an enormous baggage train was heading toward the rear.   But then redcoats popped up from below the military crest of the ridge – a Wellington favorite – and formed square.  This was almost perfect protection from cavalry, but vulnerable to French infantry volleys.   Scissors, paper, stone.

“The British were not running away. Wellington was not disengaging and trying to withdraw his forces. Yes there were men and wagons on the road, but most of the British-Dutch army was still on the ridge and they were ready to fight. . . So it was horsemen against Infantry, and every cavalryman must have known what Captain Duthilt had written, that 'it is difficult, if not impossible, for the best cavalry to break infantry who are formed in squares', so while at first the cavalrymen seemed to have pierced the British-Dutch line, instead they were faced with the worst obstacle a horseman could encounter. The wide plateau of the ridge top was packed with squares, at least twenty of them, in a rough chequer pattern so that if a horseman rode safely past one square he was immediately faced with another, and then encountered more beyond.  And each square bristled with bayonets and spat musket fire.”

And then the British cavalry joined the battle.

"[T]hat was the great disadvantage of the formation the French had chosen to use. A column made of successive battalions in line looked magnificent and, given the chance, might have spread into a formidable line to give devastating volley fire, but it would take a battalion in a three-rank line a lot of time to form square, and they would be hammered by the battalions in front and behind while they did. There was neither space nor time to form square. Major Frederick Clarke, who charged with the Scotland Greys, reckons the enemy was trying to form square, but 'the first and nearest square had not time to complete their formation, and the Greys charged through it.' So the British heavy cavalry drove into the panicking columns and [Louis] Canler tells what happened: ' A real carnage followed. Everyone was separated from his comrades and fought for his own life. Sabers and bayonets slashed at the shaking flesh for we were too close packed to use our firearms.' . . .There was no time to form square, so his unit was cut to ribbons."

Artillery could have smashed the British squares, had Ney managed to bring more guns close to the line, or deployed French infantry.  “That was the scissors, paper and stone reality of Napoleonic warfare. If you could force an enemy to form a square you could bring a line of infantry against it and overwhelm it with musket fire, and very late in the afternoon Marshal Ney at last tried that tactic, ordering 8,000 infantry to attack the British squares. . . Their task was to deploy into line and then smother the British squares with musketry, but the British would only be in square if the cavalry threatened and the French cavalry was exhausted. They had charged again and again, they had shown extraordinary courage and too many of them were now dead on the hillside. There was no charge left in them."

Eight thousand men were defeated at best, dead at worst, in minutes.   The French fled down the slope, away from Waterloo, bypassing dying men and horses, and grounds littered withed discarded cavalry swords, scabbards and breastplates.   And blood.   After that, the famous French "Imperial Guard” tried its turn, but also was too late.   The charged straight up the center of the hill, to win or die.  

"Wellington rode back towards the centre of his line. Leeks had seen him just before the 52nd marched out of line to destroy and Emperor's dreams. The Duke's clothes, Leeke said, 'consisted of a blue surtout coat, white kerseymere pantaloons, and Hessian boots. He wore a sword with a waist belt, but no sash.' The plain blue coat and black cocked hat made Wellington instantly recognizable to his men, and now, as the French began to flee, he watched from the ridge's centre for a few moments. He saw an enemy in panic, a retreating enemy that was dissolving into chaos. He watched them, then was heard to mutter, 'In for a penny, in for a pound'. He took off his cocked hat and men say that just then a slanting ray of evening sunlight came through the clouds to illuminate him on the ridge he had defended all day. He waved the hat towards the enemy. He waved it three times, and it was a signal for the whole allied army to advance."

Waterloo was an allied victory. Wellington would never have stood his ground had he not thought the Prussians would appear at his left wing. Blücher would never have marched over rock and stream had he thought Wellington would cut and run.  True, the Prussians were late to the party, but that turned out well for the Allies, fooling Napoleon into believing he could defeat each army in detail.  As it turned out, when the Allied forces joined, “The Emperor was not just defeated, he was routed."

"An easier question to answer than 'who won the battle?' Is 'who lost the battle?', and the answer must be Napoleon. The Duke and Blücher both offered leadership, but Napoleon left the conduct of the battle to Marshal Ney, who, though braver than most men, did little more than hurl troops against the most skillful defensive general of the age. The French had the time and the men to break Wellington's line, but they failed, partly because the Duke defended so cleverly, and partly because the French never coordinated an all-arms assault on the allied line. They delayed the start of the battle on a day when Wellington was praying for time. They wasted men in a time-consuming assault that lasted much of the afternoon. And why Napoleon entrusted the battle's conduct to Ney is a mystery; Ney was certainly brave, but the Emperor damned him as 'too stupid to be able to succeed', so why rely on him? And, when the French did achieve their one great success, the capture of La Haie Sainte, which enabled them to occupy the forward slope of Wellington's ridge, the Emperor refused to reinforce the centre and so gave the Duke time to bring up his own reinforcements. Finally, when the Imperial Guard did attack, it was too few and too late, and by that time, the Prussians were on the French flank and threatening their rear."

That’s Corrwell’s story of Waterloo—Rock, Paper, Scissors.  And timing.  This is no book for a Napoleonic expert.  But an excellent start for anyone wanting to dip a toe into the end of the last great French vs. Britain war.  
The Battle of Ezra Church 
and the Struggle for Atlanta

Earl J. Hess
University of North Carolina Press, 2015, 304 pp., $35.00
        
Review by Gordon Berg

Few historians possess more knowledge of the terrain of Civil War battlefields and the tactics employed on them by the contending forces than does Earl J. Hess.  From Pea Ridge to Petersburg, Hess has studied the deadly game of feint, maneuver, attack and defense.  He brings his lifetime of expertise to the deadly red dirt dance macabre performed by Union and Confederate forces in the campaign for Atlanta.  He rightly concludes that the Battle of Ezra Church, fought July 28, 1864, was an intense, but underappreciated, battle in that campaign. 

Hess divides the Atlanta Campaign into two parts: the first from Chattanooga to the Chattahoochee River pitting Union Major General William T. Sherman against the ever-cautious Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston; and the second south of the river to the gates of Atlanta between Sherman and newly appointed and offensive-minded Confederate commander John B. Hood.  Ezra Church was the third engagement between Sherman and Hood but, as Hess pointedly observes, "the primary tactical context was the domain of division, brigade, and regimental commanders."  Although generally considered a decisive Union victory, Hess maintains "The Confederates came closer to victory at Ezra Church than they had a right to expect" and only the grit of a thin blue line on the Union right possibly prevented a decidedly different outcome.

In setting the stage for describing the battle, Hess emphasizes the many command changes that occurred in both armies, somewhat unusual in the midst of an ongoing campaign.  "The shake-ups in blue and gray," he writes, "were now over just hours before the battle of Ezra Church began."  Both commanding generals had good, if somewhat complex, plans.  But, Hess reminds, "all plans are dependent on the players and the decisions they make at critical junctures in the flow of events."  And the major players--Union Major General Oliver O. Howard, just appointed the new commander of the Army of the Tennessee, and Confederate Lieutenant General Stephen D. Lee, who took command of Hood's old corps only the day before the battle-- were new and inexperienced at the tasks before them.

Sherman planned a flanking movement to the right, a favorite move that he employed with success against Johnston.  The Army of the Tennessee would move from the far left of the Union forces and swing around to the west, aiming for the last open rail line south of Atlanta at East Point.  In spite of strenuous efforts at secrecy, Hood learned that the Federals were on the move.  Hood was no Joe Johnston and "The army commander intended to strike at Sherman before the Federals could reach the vital rail link between Atlanta and Macon."  Hood knew if Sherman broke this lifeline, he would have to abandon Atlanta.  The focal point of Hood's planning was The Lick Skillet Road at the end of the Confederate defensive line.  That road intersected with a road that ran past Ezra Church, just three miles south of Atlanta.  Stephen Lee had the responsibility of holding that vital road juncture while other Confederate forces would attack the Union flank and rear.  Hood planned to open the ball the morning of July 29.

But, after heavy skirmishing, Lee jumped the gun.  Against explicit orders, he attacked on the 28th.  Hess calls it a tragic mistake and comes down hard on Lee.  "He [Lee] had scant information about the main Union position and did not know the terrain," Hess writes.  "He did not even know his own troops, and he did not bother to inform Hood of his decision, much less ask his advice about the matter."  Hess concludes that Lee "failed to obey his orders and exercised far too much latitude in taking a course of action that would kill and wound thousands of his men in a battlefield endeavor with dubious prospects."  To make matters worse, Federal observation posts detected the movement of the large Confederate force and "had sufficient warning of trouble to be ready for it."

Battle narratives, of which Hess is a master, can easily devolve into a litany of names and numbers.  Good maps and lots of them can mitigate this tendency.  As good as he is, Hess could have benefited from additional, and more descriptive, maps.


Most historians characterize Ezra Church as a clear-cut Union victory, and the body count bears that out.  Of just over 9,000 engaged, Howard lost 632 men.  On the other hand, of almost 11,500 Confederates involved, Lee lost about 3,000.  Nevertheless, Hess agrees with Henry Wright of the 6th Iowa, who argued Ezra Church "was the most stubbornly contest and bloodiest battlefield of the campaign."  Hess maintains that "[d]espite the disjointed nature of Lee's attacks, the Confederates mostly conducted the battle with a deal of spirit and came closer to success than one had a right to expect."  The soldiers who fought there--both blue and gray--would probably agree.

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Gordon Berg is a past President and member of the Civil War Round Table of the District of Columbia (www.cwrtdc.org).  His reviews and articles appear in the Civil War Times and America's Civil War, among other publications.